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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE REMEDY
OF FORCED HIRING: A COMPARATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN AND AMERICAN
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
Caroline R. Fredrickson*
(1) All people are equal before the law.
(2) Men and women have equal rights.
(3) No one may be disadvantaged or preferred based on
sex, origin, race, speech, homeland and national
origin, beliefs, religious or political opinions.'
INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1949, the post-war German Constitution, or "Basic
Law,"2 drew on Germany's prior constitutions in the democratic
tradition, but also departed significantly from that history by
incorporating elements designed to prevent any future subversions
of the democratic order. The new Constitution accomplishes this
goal by barring amendments that would erode the fundamental
principles of the new political system, meaning, in part, the social
welfare state, democracy and the rule of law. It also prohibits
amendments that would undermine the Constitution's guarantee of
basic rights and respect for human dignity.3 The Basic Law
. Attorney, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington D.C. Fellow of the Robert
Bosch Foundation in Germany, 1993-94. Graduate of Columbia Law School,
1992.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 3 (F.R.G.).
2 This article will use the terms "Basic Law" and "Constitution" inter-
changeably.
' Article 79(3) specifically prohibits amendments to Articles I and 20 of the
Basic Law. Article 1 establishes that respect for human rights is a fundamental
element of civil society and provides that the fundamental rights enumerated in
the Basic Law "shall be binding on the legislature, the executive, and the
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establishes a social welfare state committed to human rights and
equality of opportunity.
Although originally drafted to be a transitional document
pending the unification of Germany,4 the Basic Law was not
discarded in 1990 with the peaceful revolution in the East; instead,
the reunited German people chose to retain and reaffirm this trusted
document.' This decision is understandable in light of the Federal
Republic of Germany's brilliant transformation into a peaceful and
prosperous nation governed by the rule of law which has forgotten
neither working people, nor the indigent and unemployed.
The German Constitution provides that the rights contained
therein may be enforced through judicial proceedings.' Unlike
many provisions in the United States Constitution, which the
Supreme Court has determined to be nonjusticiable,7
[e]very provision of the [Basic Law] is a legally binding
norm requiring full and unambiguous implementation....
In brief, any law, administrative regulation, legal
judiciary as directly enforceable law." GG art. 1. Article 20 subjects legislation
to the "constitutional order" and binds the "executive and the judiciary to law
and justice." GG art. 20. That provision further states that Germany is a
"democratic and social federal state," and that sovereignty rests with the people.
GG art. 20.
4 See GG art. 146.
See, e.g., Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik ueber die Herstellung der Einheit
Deutschlands, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., art. 8, 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGB1] II 889 (Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic on the Establishment of German Unity).
6 See GG art. 1(3).
7 A claim is "nonjusticiable" if the subject matter is considered inappropriate
for judicial consideration. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (explaining
that in a determination of nonjusticiability the Court must inquire if "the duty
asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined and
whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded"). Claims
brought under the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution, requiring
that "[tihe United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government," have consistently been found by the Court to
be nonjusticiable. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. E.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (refusing to consider a claim that a law enacted
under Oregon's initiative law-making process violated the Guarantee Clause).
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
relationship, or political practice that cannot be justified in
terms of the Basic Law is by definition unconstitutional
and, in the German variant of the constitutional state, it
must be so declared if the order of legality and legal
certainty-among the highest values of the German
Rechtsstaat-is to be maintained.8
Thus, the fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law are not
simply hortatory, but actually operate as enforceable law. More-
over, much of the Basic Law applies not only to state action, but
also to private dealings, requiring citizens to respect each other's
rights or face possible legal process.9 For example, Article Nine,
which protects freedom of association, including the right to join
a union, may be enforced against private employers.' ° The guaran-
tee of equal treatment contained in Article Three, however, has not
been interpreted as applying to the private sector." But a close
reading of the text of Article Three reveals no evidence of a
legislative intent to differentiate between the legal force of the right
of equal treatment and the other rights enumerated in the Basic
Law. Indeed, the plain language of Article Three would suggest
that it should apply to private affairs.
Despite the promise of equal treatment contained in Article
Three and various statutes, women and minority groups have little
protection from discrimination in their basic rights. In particular,
women and minorities are often disadvantaged in the working
world--employers do not hire, promote, or pay them equal wages,
and employers suffer few penalties for their discriminatory
behavior. Commentators contend that an employer cannot be
required to offer a job to an applicant as a remedy for its discrimi-
natory failure to hire, even when this person was the most qualified
8 Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40
EMORY L.J. 837, 848 (1991).
9Id.
10 GG art. 9(3). Article Nine of the Basic Law states, in pertinent part, that:
"The right to form associations for the protection and furtherance of working and
economic conditions is guaranteed for all people and all professions. Agreements
that would limit or impede this right are null and void." Id.
" See Ingo von Muench, Introductory Comments to Articles 1-19, in
GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR 35 (Ingo von Muench ed., 2d ed. 1981).
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applicant and was rejected solely on the basis of sex, race, national
origin or ethnicity. 2 In fact, German law provides no real penal-
ties for such practices.13 German legal scholars have articulated
only one justification for the disparate treatment accorded equal
opportunity law compared to other constitutional protections:
freedom of contract.14
Freedom of contract is considered by some to be the bedrock
of a liberal free market society, giving individuals and business
entities the privilege to choose their contracting partners, the ability
to mutually determine the content of agreements and to construct
privately negotiated penalties for noncompliance with contractual
duties. 5 In Germany, the concept of freedom of contract ceased
to have much force long ago. For example, German labor law seeks
to rectify the power imbalances in the bargaining relationship
between worker and employer through, inter alia, mandated
workplace safety measures," minimum vacation time," maxi-
mum work hours 8 and limitations on employers' ability to
dismiss workers.' 9
The worker qua worker is not only well-protected, but also
powerful, exercising astonishingly broad rights to influence his or
her conditions of work as well as some areas of company policy.2"
In no other country in the world have workers acquired the
extensive participatory rights that they have won in Germany. By
failing to provide remedies for discrimination in hiring, however,
12 See, e.g., MANFRED WEISS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 62 (1994).
'3 Id. at 62-63. See infra pp. 15-16.
14 See, e.g., WEISS, supra note 12, at 47.
"s E.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI.
L. REv. 947, 953-55 (1984).
16 See, e.g., Gesetz ueber Betriebsaerzte, Sicherheitsingenieure und andere
Fachkraefte fuer Arbeitssicherheit [Law Governing Workplace Doctors, Safety
Engineers and Other Workplace Safety Specialists], 1973 BGB1. 11885.
17 See Mindesturlaubsgesetzfuer Arbeitnehmer [Minimum Vacation Law for
Employees], 1963 BGB1. I 2.
1 See Arbeitszeitordnung [Regulation Concerning Work Hours], 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] I 447.
'9 See Kuendigungsschutzgesetz [Termination Protection Law] [KSchG],
1969 BGBI. 1 1317.
20 See infra pp. 24-25.
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the German welfare state has not protected workers against
exclusion or unfair treatment based on the irrelevant characteristics
of race, ethnicity or gender. The German courts and academic
commentators argue that freedom of contract justifies this over-
sight.2
1
Part I of this article will provide a brief synopsis of the concept
of freedom of contract in the labor relationship, using developments
in the United States to provide a contrast to the German approach.
In part II, this article will consider what role the concept of
freedom of contract plays in contemporary German labor law. In
particular, it will examine the application of freedom of contract in
the formation, content and termination of employment relationships,
demonstrating that the doctrine has little, if any, force outside the
area of anti-discrimination measures. This article concludes that
traditional arguments advanced by German jurists legitimating
disparate treatment of women and minorities by reference to
freedom of contract cannot be reconciled with other areas of
German jurisprudence and should be rethought.
I. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT: THEORY AND HISTORY
A. The American Notion of Freedom of Contract
In nineteenth century America, judges and politicians extolled
the virtues of freedom of contract with great fervency.22 As the
free market philosophy became dominant, antiquated theories of
human relationships were rejected.23 In law, this development is
21 See, e.g., MANFRED LOEWISCH, ARBEITSRECHT (3d ed. 1991); see also
HERBERT BUCHNER, MUENCHNER HANDBUCH ARBEITSRECHT (ReinhardRichardi
& Otfried Wlotzke eds., 1993); Interview with judges of the Federal Labor
Court, in Kassel, Germany (Mar. 1-3, 1994).
22 See Justice Rufus Peckham's discussion of freedom of contract in
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 583-93 (1897).
23 See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 4-11
(1 1th ed. 1991); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR 159-60
(1991) ("Increasingly ... men and women refused to accept the formal
hierarchical practices that had defined traditional master-servant relations. . ").
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often characterized as the transformation from status to contract.24
Birth, it was thought, should not play a decisive role in situating
someone in the social order. Rather, people ought to be free to
choose the particular relationships that they wish to have, for whom
they wish to work, which applicants they prefer to hire and how the
association between the parties will unfold. Each market participant
has the liberty to negotiate for what he or she wants. Supporters of
this philosophy argue that it serves several goals. First, and perhaps
most important, they argue that unfettered bargaining safeguards
individual liberty, which is an essential value in civil society.
25
Second, freedom of contract invigorates the economy;26 the
market functions most efficiently when people can pursue their
interests without being hindered by the heavy hand of the state.
Thus, liberty of contract, according to its followers, is both a virtue
in itself as well as a utilitarian good, guaranteeing the most
efficient creation and distribution of wealth.27
Adherents of the free market philosophy in the nineteenth
century maintained that freedom of contract applied to all contracts,
including those between companies, between companies and
customers, and between employers and employees. 28 Even in the
early twentieth century, these advocates continued to insist that
freedom of contract existed in all contexts, including the employ-
ment relationship, 29 despite inhumane working conditions and
starvation wages in many industries. Federal and state courts also
adhered to this strict notion of freedom of contract. Consequently,
many worker protection laws were struck down by judges who re-
peatedly cited the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
24 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW 13-28 (2d ed. 1991); STEINFELD, supra note 23, passim (1991).
25 See Epstein, supra note 15, at 953-55.
26 See Epstein, supra note 15, at 951, 963-77.
27 For a thorough exposition of this philosophy, see Epstein, supra note 15,
at 953-76.
28 See generally DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND TAXATION (J.M. Dent & Sons 1987) (1817).
29 See Justice Peckham's discussion of freedom of contract in the employ-
ment context in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-61 (1905).
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Amendments as the constitutional basis for freedom of contract.30
For example, the courts invalidated laws requiring the regular
payment of wages in cash,3' establising maximum work hours32
and setting minimum wages.33 Federal and state court judges also
rigorously supported employers' efforts to rid the workplace of
labor organizations.
3 4
The Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v New York35 offers
a notable example of judicial deference to freedom of contract.36
In Lochner, the Supreme Court voided a New York law that set the
maximum working time for bakers at ten hours per day and sixty
hours per week. Citing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found
that the law interfered with the constitutionally protected liberty of
contract. 3'7 According to the Court, "[t]he right to purchase or to
sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment. ,38
The majority admitted, however, that liberty of contract is not
unconstrained. The police power, noted Justice Rufus Peckham,
allows the state to impose certain conditions on the making of a
contract, such as forbidding agreements that have an illegal act as
their objective.39 In articulating the scope of the police power, the
Court stated:
3' The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving
any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the requirement of due
process to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31 See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 59 P. 304, 307 (Cal. 1899).
32 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
" Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
34 See Vegelahn v. Gunther, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896); WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
(1991). Appendix A to Forbath's book contains a list of the protective labor laws
struck down in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
3 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
36 Also illustrative of the judicial deference to freedom of contract is the
Court's decision in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the
Supreme Court struck down a law that banned so-called "yellow dog" contracts
whereby employers required prospective employees to sign away their right to
join a union.
" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 53-54.
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Those powers . . . relate to the safety, health, morals and
general welfare of the public. Both property and liberty are
held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by
the governing power of the State in the exercise of those
powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth
Amendment was not designed to interfere.4 °
Nonetheless, the Justices found that a law setting maximum work
hours was not a valid exercise of the state's police power. The
Court asked whether the statute was
a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the State, or . . . an unreasonable, unnecessary,
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual
. . . to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support
of himself and his family.
41
Regarding its position as self-evident, the Court stated that "[t]here
is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or
the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the
occupation of a baker."42
As the twentieth century advanced, however, ever more legal
scholars and politicians continued to attack the sanctity of freedom
of contract as it applied to the wage relationship. Workers, they
insisted, cannot exercise liberty of contract as individuals because
their severe inequality in bargaining power compels them to accept
most terms proposed by a potential employer.43 These commen-
tators argued that the sale of labor is qualitatively different from a
sale of commodities. 44 Not only does the employer exercise a
psychological domination over the employment relationship based
on hierarchical superiority, but the employer also has an almost
40 Id. at 53.
41 Id. at 56.
42 Id at 57.
41 See id at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting); STEINFELD, supra note 23, at 157-58
(quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 729-31 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephram Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1978) (4th ed.
1956)).
44 See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 603, 626 (1943).
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existential control over the worker.45 Unlike the decision to buy
a car or trade securities, the decision to sell one's labor derives
from pure need.46 The employer's ability to coerce grows expo-
nentially with an applicant's proximity to hunger and homelessness,
giving the boss a potentially tyrannical hold over the worker. Only
the presence of unions could make the uneven negotiating strength
between employer and employee equal. Without the right to
unionize, it was argued, workers' freedom of contract remained a
cloak for exploitation.47
Only during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt did
the views of these commentators find support in the federal courts.
From the Lochner decision to the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court
had invalidated a series of protective labor laws relying on its usual
and now quite familiar argument.48 In 1937, however, the Court
changed its course. Two crucial cases in that year served as the
watershed of a new era in American jurisprudence with respect to
the regulation of labor relations.49 In NLRB v Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.," the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA").5' Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935
to ensure workers the right to negotiate collectively and to require
employers to recognize and bargain with their employees' chosen
representative. In addition, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish,
5 2
the Court determined that minimum wage laws could be compatible
41 Id. at 627 (stating that the employer brings a greater degree of compulsion
to the bargaining table than the employee).
46 See id. at 626.
41 Cf Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 481-87 (1909)
(discussing the importance of labor legislation, including "legislation fobidding
employers from interfering with the membership of their employees in labor
unions," to bring about equality).
41 See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330
(1935); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
49 See COX ET AL., supra note 23, at 88-89.
'o 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
"1 Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)).
52 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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with the constitutional guarantee of liberty. In upholding the
Washington State law, the Court developed a new approach to the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of Due Process:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It
speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is
liberty in a social organization which requires the pro-
tection of law against the evils which menace the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of
due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation
to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process. 3
Interestingly, the arguments advanced by the Supreme Court in
Lochner and West Coast Hotel are remarkably similar-they both
agree that liberty is subject to certain constraints within a civil
society. The cases differ, however, in evaluating the validity of
certain restrictions: that is, whether regulation of working con-
ditions constitutes a reasonable means to protect the "health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people."54 In West Coast Hotel, the
Court handed over the preeminent role in determining the limits of
reasonable regulation to the elected representatives of the people
and rejected the powerful supervisory role accorded the judiciary
by its earlier decisions." In a democratic society, the Court opined,
unelected judges should not have such expansive powers to
contravene the people's will to protect health, safety, morals, or
welfare in its chosen manner. 6
Once the Supreme Court had condoned the NLRAs require-
ment that an employer bargain with the elected representative of its
" Id. at 391.
54 Id.
" Id. at 393-99. The Court stated that, "[in dealing with the relation of
employer and employed, the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of
discretion." Id. at 393.
16 See id. at 398.
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
employees, freedom of contract became an increasingly shaky
theoretical justification for refusing to enter into a contract on the
basis of sex or race. Thus, in the area of racial and gender
discrimination, the Court came to accept a positive right to
contract. Consequently, when an employer or property owner
refuses to enter into a contract with someone due to race or sex, the
Court has found the forcible conclusion of a contract, in the private
as well as the public sphere, to be an acceptable remedy. For
example, in Runyon v McCrary,57 the Court held that the Civil
Rights Act of 186658 barred a private school from refusing to
accept African American children as students. Arguing against this
compelled conclusion of a contract, the dissent contended that
Congress enacted the Civil War Era law only to prohibit govern-
ment incursions on free contracting and not to provide a positive
right to execute an agreement. 9 The majority rejected the
dissent's argument, noting that White children would have been
allowed to study at the school, and therefore, to guarantee the
"same right to contract" was to ensure that the minority students
could attend the school.6 °
Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196461 pro-
scribes discrimination in employment and foresees, as a possible
remedy, the hiring of the victim by the perpetrator. Prior to its
" 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
5 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees to all citizens the same right to
make and enforce contracts as White citizens. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1,
14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). See
generally Caroline R. Fredrickson, The Misreading of Patterson v. McClean
Credit Union: The Diminishing Scope of Section 1981, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 891
(1991).
'9 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 193-94 (White, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 170-74. In reaching its decision, the Court relied, in part, on
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), in which 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1988) was also found to bar discrimination in the rental of property by private
citizens. Id. at 170-71.
61 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to e-17 (1988)).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (indicating that remedies "may include ...
reinstatement or hiring of employees"). Other possible methods of compensation
are damages, back pay, or reinstatement in the case of discriminatory termi-
nation. Id
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passage, Title VII was criticized as potentially impairing freedom
of contract.63 But that attack earned no support from other
legislators and did not undermine the passage or enforcement of the
law. Thus, in the thousands of cases alleging discrimination since
the enactment of Title VII, judges have considered forced hiring as
a possible remedy for the denial of a job solely based on race, sex,
national origin, or religion.
B. The German Notion of Freedom of Contract
In the late twentieth century, few legal commentators, in the
United States or elsewhere, would describe the bargaining relation-
ship between individual employees and employers as an exchange
between equal parties. This changed appreciation of the employ-
ment relationship has taken hold in Germany most profoundly. An
authoritative introduction to labor law issued by the German
government, declares that the role of labor law is to protect the
employee.64 As the government notes:
Historical experience teaches that without protection
through labor legislation and collective bargaining agree-
ments, the individual employee was in an inferior position
with respect to the employer and was often exposed to
unfair and inhumane working conditions, inadequate
protection from workplace accidents, overly long working
hours, etc. Today, the labor relationship is restricted
through laws, collective bargaining agreements and works
agreements.65
As in the United States, industrialization in nineteenth century
Germany altered the traditional relationship between shop owner
and worker. Replacing the paternalistic bonds between master and
servant, the liberal market economy adjudged the labor relationship
a pure exchange of goods-an exchange of labor for wages.66
63 110 CONG. REC. 1620 (1964).
64 GUENTER HALBACH ET AL., UEBERSICHT UEBER DAs RECHT DER ARBEIT
[Review of the Right to Work] 53 (4th ed. 1991).
65 Id.
66 See Reinhard Richardi, Introduction to ARBEITSGESETZE at x-xi
(Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1993).
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Working conditions deteriorated under continuing pressure from job
applicants who were ready to underbid their competitors in order
to feed their families.67 Nineteenth century lawmakers in Germany
slowly, however, began to concern themselves with the abhorrent
situation of working people-although perhaps not solely out of
humanitarian concerns.6" The Parliament introduced voluntary
works councils in 1891.69 Contemporaneously, a new social
insurance law provided workers with some financial security if
accidents or sickness arose.7" These reforms were limited,
67 HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 27.
68 See WEISS, supra note 12, at 26.
69 Works councils originated in the workshop committees of the nineteenth
century. Existing in isolated workplaces and on a strictly voluntary basis, these
shop committees originally performed less the role of employee representation
than that of employee oversight. In 1889, striking miners unsuccessfully
demanded the establishment of obligatory committees empowered to present
worker complaints as well as to influence management in a small number of
areas. Following a coal strike in the Ruhr region in 1905, Prussia, which at that
time comprised most of Germany, made the committees compulsory in mines
with over 100 employees. These committees, however, found little support
among the workers because their primary duty was to foster good relations in the
workplace and they were easily dissolved by the authorities. BETRVG:
BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ KOMMENTAR FUER DIE PRAXIS 106-07 (Wolfgang
Daeubler et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). During World War I, the requirement of shop
committees was extended to industries producing essential products in an effort
to minimize dissatisfaction among workers which might, in turn, hamper the war
effort. In 1920, the Weimar Republic established works councils with consulta-
tive powers vis a vis management, nationwide. See id; Clyde W. Summers,
Worker Participation in the United States and the Federal Republic: A
Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 5 RECHT DER ARBEIT 257,
260 (1979).
70 In 1883, the German government instituted compulsory sickness insurance
that was financed primarily by employees and provided meager benefits. One
year later, the German government introduced compulsory accident insurance.
Unlike sickness insurance, employers paid for accident insurance, but due to the
significant limitations on its use, its relevance for workers was questionable. In
1889, the government completed its major social welfare initiatives by
implementing old-age and invalid insurance. Again, severe limits on the use of
this insurance made the laws largely ineffective. See GORDON A. CRAIG,
GERMANY 1866-1945, at 150-52 (1978); GERHARD A. RITTER, SOCIAL WELFARE
IN GERMANY AND BRITAIN, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 103 ff. (Kim Traynor
trans., 1983); Juergen Tampke, Bismarck's Social Legislation: A Genuine
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however, and it was only during the Weimar Republic that the
position of German workers began to improve substantially.7'
Maximum hour limits, protection for working mothers, restrictions
on termination, as well as worker representation through the works
council and supervisory board were all implemented at this time.72
Although most of these laws were abrogated by the National
Socialists, they were quickly reintroduced and supplemented after
World War II." Thus, like their American counterparts, German
legislators and legal commentators came to accept that the concept
of freedom of contract has distinct limits. Principles other, and
sometimes more important, than freedom of contract were deter-
mined to merit consideration in resolving social conflict.
In discussions about discrimination in the hiring of women or
members of ethnic or racial minority groups, however, freedom of
contract resurfaces in German jurisprudence as a justification for
imposing limits on equality. As scholars pronounce without
criticism or explication, contractual liberty takes precedence over
the constitutional right of equal treatment.74 Additionally, because
legal scholars-whose opinions are exceedingly influential on the
German judiciary-find the hiring process to be especially
sacrosanct, the application of the constitutional guarantee of equal
treatment to the formation of the work relationship is therefore
limited.75
Breakthrough?, in THE EMERGENCE OF THE WELFARE STATE IN BRITAIN AND
GERMANY 71-83 (W.J. Mommsen & Wolfgang Mock eds., 1981).
71 HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 28. The Weimar Republic governed
Germany from 1919 to 1933. CRAIG, supra note 70, at 396.
72 See BETRVG: BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ KOMMENTAR FUER DIE
PRAXIS, supra note 69, at 107-08; HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 28.
73 See HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 29; Richardi, supra note 66, at xi-
xii; Summers, supra note 69, at 260.
74 LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at 59; see also BUCHNER, supra note 21, at
509.
75 LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at 59; BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 509.
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II. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN GERMANY: WORKERS, WOMEN
AND FOREIGNERS
Unlike the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment in Article
Three of the Basic Law, the principle of freedom of contract is not
explicitly set forth in the Constitution. Rather, freedom of contract
is derived from the constitutional right to choose and exercise a
profession contained in Article Twelve.76 Implicit in Article
Twelve, according to German scholars, is an employer's right to
retain some control over the operation of his or her business,
including the making of contracts.77 Limitations on Article
Twelve's guarantee, however, are permissible under the Basic Law
when justified by a need to protect the general welfare, when the
means chosen are narrowly tailored and necessary to serve that end,
and when the justification outweighs the severity of the in-
cursion.78 This balancing test grants German legislators a great
amount of freedom to pursue regulatory goals in the area of
employment and social relations.79
Preventing discrimination in the hiring process, however, seems
to fall outside the general power to legislate in the public interest
and is trumped by Article Twelve.8 ° Thus, an employer's idio-
syncratic hiring decisions cannot be challenged. The employer can
make the job dependent on test results, the outcome of an investi-
gation, or any other measures that have no bearing on the job in
question. In such cases, the employer's motive is irrelevant.8' To
justify such behavior, judges argue that forced hiring would violate
76 Article 12 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "All Germans have the right
to choose their profession, workplace and place of employment. The exercise of
a profession can be regulated by law." GG art. 12. See also BUCHNER, supra note
21, at 500; WEISS, supra note 12, at 62.
77 See, e.g., BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 500; WEISS, supra note 12, at 62.
78 See BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 500 (citing Judgment of Jan. 23, 1990,
81 BVerfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 156 ff).
79 See BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 500.
So LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at 385-86. Thus, the employer is not legally
prohibited from refusing to hire foreign workers. LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at
385-86; see also HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 48-49.
81 LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at 385-86.
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the principle of freedom of contract.8 2 Given the rampant in-
cursions into contractual freedom in other areas of the law, this
explanation is unpersuasive. In the following discussion, this article
will examine the protection of freedom of contract in practice, and
in the making, the content and the termination of contracts.
A. Entering into a Contract
According to German legal scholars, the Basic Law guarantees
against infringement of the freedom to enter into a contract.8 3 One
may not, therefore, be forced to sign a contract.8 4 Minimal
research, however, reveals numerous exceptions to this guaran-
tee.85 Germany encroaches upon an employer's free choice in
hiring in many ways, including prohibitions on anti-union discrimi-
nation,16 the declaration of generally binding collective bargaining
agreements87 and the compelled hiring of injured miners and
apprentices serving as members of the works council.
1. Discrimination Against Union Members
The Basic Law endorses freedom of association and coalition-
building as a fundamental constitutional right. Article Nine ensures
that workers may join unions for mutual aid and collective
2 Interview with judges of the Federal Labor Court, in Kassel, Germany
(Mar. 1-3, 1994).
83 BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 500.
94 See BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 500-01.
" Outside the employment field, German law requires private companies
holding monopoly control over important products to provide those products to
all consumers. Insurance companies are the major target of this obligation.
Moreover, quasi-public institutions, such as museums and hospitals, also must
provide services to all. See INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH OF MIGRATION AND
RACISM, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION, RACISM AND
XENOPHOBIA AND INCITEMENT UND [sic] HATRED AND RACIAL VIOLENCE § 3
(1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY].
86 See discussion of Article 9 infra part II.A. 1.
87 See discussion of Germany's Collective Agreement Act infra p. 22.
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bargaining, and it prevents employers from discriminating against
union members in the hiring process. By virtue of its status as a
"protective law," Article Nine falls under section 823, paragraph 2
of the Civil Code. 8 This provision provides a claim in tort for
damages caused by the violation of a protective law and may
require the tortfeasor to make reparations by restoring the victim to
the position that he or she would have been in had the illegal act
not taken place.89 Thus, in the case of failure to hire based on anti-
union discrimination, an employer can be required to hire the
victim.90 If a job is not an acceptable remedy because of the
worker's disinclination to work for a discriminatory establishment,
the compensation may take the form of money damages, or in a
particularly grievous case, the wronged applicant may be entitled
to compensation for pain and suffering under section 847 of the
Civil Code.9 Commentators accept these remedies as essential to
fulfilling Article Nine's protection of associational rights.9 2
Although constitutional guarantees of equal treatment, as well
as statutory anti-discrimination, provisions appear to conform to the
description of protective laws, these laws have not been so
construed. A brief examination of these laws reveals the specious-
ness of the judicial arguments against providing a remedy for
employment dicrimination.
88 LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at 100. Section 823, 2 of the Civil Code,
reads in part, as follows: "Any person who violates a law whose purpose is the
protection of other persons has the responsibility" to compensate the victim for
the injury. Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 823.
89 BGB § 823; see also Josephine Shaw, Recent Developments in the Field
of Labour Market Equality: Sex Discrimination Law in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 18, 30 (1991). The Termination Protection Law,
which prevents wrongful discharge, has been interpreted as a "protective law,"
a breach of which may result in damages of one year's salary. See infra p. 26.
90 Judgment of June 6, 1987, BAG, 45 DER BETRIEB 2312 (1987). The
Supreme Labor Court ruled that an employer who refused to hire an applicant
because she would not give up her union membership, could not rely on freedom
of contract to protest the forced conclusion of an employment contract. The
Court stated that "[t]hey were ready to enter a contract with the applicant. They
had found her suited. They made the position dependent on an impermissible
condition." Id; see also BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 570.
91 LOEWISCH, supra note 21, at 101.
92 BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 570.
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Under section 611(a) of the Civil Code,93 employers are
forbidden to discriminate on the grounds of sex in any matter
relating to employment, unless sex is a necessary requirement for
the job.94 Section 611(a) is derived from Directive 76/207 of the
European Economic Community," which Germany translated into
national law in 1980, two years after the deadline for its implemen-
tation.96 Although the Directive required the member states to
provide adequate compensation for victims of sex discrimination in
the employment relationship, the German version restricts recovery
essentially to the costs of making the job application-that is, the
envelope and stamp used to mail a resume or bus fare to get to a
job interview.97 In two cases which came before the European
Court, a pair of German women argued that they had not been
adequately compensated by the German courts for discrimination
in hiring, and that the practical bar on damages of section 611(a)
violated European law.9 Despite unequivocal evidence of discrimi-
nation, the women applicants had received only DM 2.31 and DM
7.20, respectively, in damages from the German courts. 99 The
European Court determined that section 611(a)'s purely symbolic
9' BGB § 611(a).
" For example, it is legal to refuse female applicants for male roles in a
play. See BGB § 61 l(a)(1) (indicating that disparate treatment is permissible,
when in view of the nature of the occupation, it is absolutely necessary to be a
male or female); HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 49.
9' Council Directive 76/207 of Feb. 10, 1975 on Equal Treatment, 1975 O.J.
(L 39) 40.
96 Gesetz ueber die Gleichbehandlung von Maennern und Frauen im
Arbeitsplatz (Gleichhandlungsgesetz) [Equal Treatment Law], 1980 BGB1. I
1308; see also Klaus Bertelsmann & Heide M. Pfarr, Diskriminierung von
Frauen bei der Einstellung und Befoerderung, in 24 DER BETRIEB 1297 (1984);
Shaw, supra note 89, at 24.
97 See WEISS, supra note 12, at 63.
98 See Case 14/83, Van Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R.
1891; Case 79/83, Harz v. Deutsche Tradax, 1984 E.C.R. 1921; Bertelsmann &
Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1297; Shaw, supra note 89, at 24.
99 Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1297. In American currency, these
amounts are roughly equal to $1.40 and $4.20 respectively.
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reprimand did not effectuate the Community's dictate and Germany
was instructed to rewrite the provision."'
The legislature, however, has failed to agree on an adequate
solution. To fill in the gap, judges on the Federal Labor Court have
attempted to determine appropriate compensation, setting a
maximum recovery of one month's salary.01 Not surprisingly,
they argue that freedom of contract prevents the courts from
ordering a perpetrator to compensate more generously or to hire the
victim.102
Despite the Federal Labor Court's reservations, a small group
of commentators have contended that a job contract should be a
possible remedy for discrimination in hiring under current German
law.13 Just as in cases of discrimination against union members,
women applicants should be put in the position that they would
have been in absent discrimination-that is, in the job."4 These
commentators find legal support for their contention in two
provisions contained in the Civil Code. First, they argue that
discrimination in hiring falls under the principle of Verschulden bei
Vertragsschluss or culpa in contrahendo (fault in contracting)
which enforces the duty to bargain in good faith.'0 5 As a remedy,
the victim should be put in the same position that he or she would
have been in had the other party not committed a punishable breach
'00 See Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1297; Shaw, supra note 89,
at 24.
101 Judgment of Mar. 14, 1989, BAG, 45 DER BETRIEB 2279 (1989); see
also Shaw, supra note 89, at 31-32.
102 Interview with judges of the Federal Labor Court in Kassel, Germany
(Mar. 1-3, 1994).
103 See WOLFGANG DAEUBLER, 2 DAs ARBEITSREcHT 690 (7th ed. 1990);
Bertelsman & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1301. Because § 611(a) implicitly
precludes the remedy of a job contract, these scholars argue that the supremacy
of European Community Law requires interpreting the provision to limit contract
but not tort claims; see also Shaw, supra note 89, at 29-30.
104 DAEUBLER, supra note 103, at 690-91.
105 Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1301. A violation of the duty to
bargain in good faith entitles the victim to damages as set forth in § 249 of the
Civil Code. That provision requires that one who is obligated to pay damages
must put the victim in the position that he or she would have been in but for the
injury. BGB § 249.
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in negotiation. This remedy would entitle a job applicant who
would have been hired but for sex discrimination, to be awarded
the job as a remedy. Second, section 823, paragraph 2 of the Civil
Code recognizes that compensation is due for violations of
protective laws. This provision should apply to sex discrimination
because section 611 (a) fits the description of a protective law under
the Civil Code. 1 6 Because section 611 (a)'s purpose is specifically
to protect women against discrimination in employment, it can be
analogized to other laws that fall within 611 (a)'s ambit, such as the
protection of freedom of association"0 7 and the protection against
wrongful discharge.0 8
The application of section 823 to Article Three of the Basic
Law should ensure equal rights to enter into employment contracts
for minorities and women by treating the constitutional guarantee
as a protective law, in the same manner that section 611 (a) protects
women. After all, Article Three, paragraph 3 of the Basic Law
postulates that no one shall be disadvantaged or preferred based on
race, speech, national origin, homeland, beliefs, religious or
political opinions, or sex and has been described as a cardinal
ordering principle of this area of the law. 9 Similarly, under the
principle of fault in contracting, an employer's breach of the duty
to bargain in good faith, by excluding the most qualified applicant
solely because of race, should entitle that person to the job as a
remedy. In practice, however, these fundamental principles have not
been applied to discrimination directed at minorities. For example,
the courts interpret the principle of equal treatment contained in
Article Three as having no relevance in the hiring or in termination
.06 Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1300. Under § 823, 1, someone
whose "general right of personality" has been violated must be compensated for
pain and suffering. BGB § 823. This provision of the Civil Code protects an
individual's right to respect and the right to develop one's personality. The right
to enter a profession falls under this provision and, thus, victims of discrimi-
nation in hiring should receive these damages as well. Applicants who were not
considered from the outset because of their sex would receive money damages
under this paragraph of § 823 even when they might not have received an offer
even without discrimination. Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1300.
117 See discussion of freedom of association supra p. 3.
'o' See discussion of the Termination Protection Law infra part II.C.
109 HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 116.
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of employment."1 Moreover, the employee can sign away this
right to equal treatment in the workplace so long as the employer
has not applied "impermissible pressure."' In contrast, an
employer may not coerce an employee to bargain away protections
embodied in a "general labor law norm or basic principle,"' 2
classifications which apparently do not include anti-discrimination
provisions.
The arguments against granting section 611 (a), or Article Three,
the status of a protective law range from weak to non-existent."
3
One might argue, that in addition to relying on the oft-mentioned
principle of freedom of contract, an anti-discrimination provision
could be considered a protective law, only if compensation for the
injury were feasible in practice. Compensation for discrimination
is not possible, one could contend, because injuries suffered from
discrimination, are basically unprovable and immeasurable. In the
case of laws such as Article Nine's protection of freedom of
association, or the Termination Protection Law, however, such
qualms have not deterred their interpretation as protective laws. 114
Such laws provide analogies which would give the courts a starting
point for calculating appropriate damages when hiring the ag-
grieved applicant was not possible. For example, with the
Termination Protection Law, when an employee is fired unjustly
but cannot return to the labor relationship for personal reasons, the
law foresees severance pay of up to twelve months salary.115 In
any case, only the most overt examples of discrimination lead to
1' HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 117.
... HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 117.
"2 HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 117.
113 Judges responding to questions at the Federal Labor Court gave no
justification apart from the familiar intonation of freedom of contract. Interviews
with judges of the Federal Labor Court, in Kassel, Germany (Mar. 1-3, 1994).
114 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra
note 96, at 1299-300.
15 See KSchG §§ 9, 10; Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96, at 1299-300.
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legal process due to the difficulty of proving a discrimination
claim. 116
2. Collective Bargaining Agreements on a Grand Scale
Apart from the example of forced contracting with union
members, German law contains many provisions which may require
the forcible conclusion of a contract as a possible remedy for
employment discrimination. The generally binding collective
bargaining agreement, Allgemeinverbindlicherklaerung("AVE")," 7 represents the most pervasive example of forced
contracting, and perhaps the greatest incursion on free contracting.
Normal collective bargaining agreements function to order the
relationship between the negotiating partners, usually establishing
maximum hour rules, vacation days and wage classifications. The
AVE, by contrast, extends the labor compact to companies that are
not members of an employer association, who did not sign the
agreement, or even wish to be parties to the collective agree-
ment." 8 The preconditions for an AVE include the application to
the Minister of Labor by one of the bargaining partners, a legally
effective collective bargaining agreement, the employment of at
least fifty percent of the workers in that industrial sector by
members of the negotiating employer association and benefit to the
116 For example, in most discrimination cases, victims often lack access to
the applications of otherjob candidates. See Bertelsmann & Pfarr, supra note 96,
at 1301.
117 Tarifvertragsgesetz[Collective Agreements Act] [TVG] § 5, 1969 BGB1.
I 1323. Under § 5, the Federal Minister for Labor, in agreement with a
committee consisting of three representatives each from umbrella organizations
of employees and employers, can declare a collective bargaining agreement
generally binding upon application of one of the parties to the agreement if: 1)
the employers who are parties to the agreement employ not less than 50% of the
employees within the scope of the agreement, and 2) the declaration of general
binding appears to be in the public interest. TVG § 5.
18 Many German employers voluntarily join employers' associations which
subject them to industry-wide collective bargaining agreements even if their
employees are not unionized. These collective bargaining agreements serve as
instruments of national economic policy by establishing minimum standards in
many areas of the labor market. See Summers, supra note 69, at 261.
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public from broader application of the collective bargaining
agreement." 9 In the name of public interest, the Minister of
Labor can proclaim an agreement generally binding in order to
prevent a worsening of labor conditions which might result from
the actions of employers who are not members of a signatory
association and therefore might undercut collective bargaining
agreements.120 Consequently, collective agreements have been
extended to cover up to one-fifth of the work force.' 2'
The AVE appears to be an imposition on the very aspect of
freedom of contract that is allegedly sacrosanct in Germany. If it
is permissible to extend the binding force of the collective
agreement to noncontracting parties despite the doctrine of freedom
of contract, then forced hiring should be a viable remedy for
discrimination. Some might argue that there are great differences
between the individualized contract and the collective one. The
major distinction between the two, however, is that the terms of the
former apply to more people and is a difference in scope and not
in kind. Furthermore, the collective contract imposes a greater
number of onerous contractual requirements on the employer than
does an agreement with a single employee.
3. Miners and Apprentices as Protected Classes
Two further examples of the use of forced contracting in
German labor law involve the forced hiring of handicapped miners
and members of the works council who are only apprentices. In
several of the German states, 22 the possessor of a miner's main-
tenance certificate (Bergmannsversorgungschein) must be given
special consideration in the hiring process. 123 In the German state
19 TVG § 5; see also Summers, supra note 69, at 261; WEISS, supra note
12, at 141-42.
120 See GUENTER SCHAUB, ARBEITSRECHT HANDBUCH 1067-68 (4th ed.
1979).
121 See Summers, supra note 69, at 261.
122 Such examples of forced contracting can be found in Niedersachsen and
Nordrhein-Westfalen. See HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 49.
123 In these states, quotas are used, as they are used throughout Germany
with respect to the employment of the disabled, that require a specific percentage
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of the Saarland, this consideration permits local authorities to
mandate the hiring of such a miner against the will of the em-
ployer.2 4 In the case of a works council member who is only an
apprentice (Auszubildender) and thus has no employment contract
with the employer, section 78(a) of the Works Constitution Act
requires the employer to enter into a regular labor agreement with
the apprentice at the end of his or her apprenticeship. 25 Accord-
ing to commentators, apprentices would be discouraged from
serving on the works council without a guarantee of obtaining a job
at the end of the training period because they would fear that works
council activity would diminish their chances of permanent
employment. 26 Although admitting that this obligation verges on
an infringement of freedom of contract, one commentator justifies
its application on the basis of the infrequency with which such
cases occur. 12 7 Similarly, civil cases in Germany alleging racial
or sexual discrimination in hiring are virtually nonexistent.128
B. Content of Labor Contracts
Germany has enacted a system of regulation of labor contracts
which mandates a myriad of implied terms, most of which benefit
the employee. From an American perspective, these rights are quite
astonishing. The Works Constitution Act grants workers significant
participation rights in the workplace by establishing an elected
works council entitled to extensive information from management
and with veto power over many traditional management de-
cisions. 129 For example, the employer may not hire or transfer an
employee without the approval of the works council. 3 ' The
works council also possesses expansive rights to initiate
of jobs to be filled by former miners. HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 49.
124 HALBACH ET AL., supra note 64, at 49.
125 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] § 78(a), 1989 BGB1. I 902.
126 BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 501-02; see also, WEISS, supra note 12, at
175.
127 BUCHNER, supra note 21, at 502.
128 NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 85, § 3.
129 See Summers, supra note 69, passim.
130 BetrVG § 99.
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decisionmaking and to participate as coequals with management in
areas such as setting work times and method of payment, intro-
duction and use of technology for worker supervision and the
administration of workplace benefits such as cafeterias and sports
facilities.' A "conciliation committee," consisting of an equal
number of works council and employer representatives, and a
mutually acceptable chairperson, settles disagreements.'32 Workers
also have participation rights in their company's supervisory board
under the Codetermination Law.'33 Worker representatives elected
to the board have the same rights and responsibilities as the
shareholder representatives who generally outnumber them.'34
Through these laws, the German Parliament has sanctioned far-
reaching incursions into an employer's traditional control over
contractual relationships with its employees.
A series of laws and regulations provide minimum standards in
the German workplace, such as stringent health and safety
standards, minimum vacation time, job security during parental
leave or civil or military service and extremely generous sick
pay.' This list, although far from exhaustive, relays the potency
of these ordinances. For example, the Parental Leave Law requires
an employer to hold a position for up to three years while a parent
is raising a newborn child.' 36 Those performing their military or
... BetrVG § 87(1)1-12. See generally Summers, supra note 69.
132 BetrVG § 87(2); BetrVG § 76.
" Gesetz ueber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer [Codetermination
Law] [MitbestG], 1976 BGB1. I 1153. The supervisory board in a German
corporation performs two primary functions: first, it selects the managing board
which handles the day-to-day management of the company; and second, it
supervises the managing board's conduct of business. See Roland Koestler,
Codetermination in German Enterprises, in CODETERMINATION: INTRODUCTION
INTO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF WORKER PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 5 (Hans-Boeckler-Foundation).
134 Koestler, supra note 133, at 7.
'3 See Manfred Weiss, Labor Law and Industrial Relations in Europe 1992:
A German Perspective, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 411, 416 (1990) ("It is quite possible
that this body of protective law is the most comprehensive legislation of its kind
in the world.").
136 Gesetz ueber die Gewaehrung von Erziehungsgeld und Erziehungsurlaub
[Law Regarding the Provision of Parental Pay and Parental Leave] [BErzGG],
1992 BGB1. I 68.
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civil service duty also retain the right to return to their job and
receive all of the advantages that they would have gained had they
been working for that time. 3 7 Thus, the years spent in service
count towards salary and pension calculations. Furthermore, every
company must provide at least eighteen days of paid vacation 3 '
and pay up to six weeks wages to a sick employee per illness. 3 9
These examples demonstrate that German legislators have no
qualms about dictating contract components, and they leave
individual employers and applicants little sovereignty to haggle
over the specific details of their association. It appears that German
legislators, therefore, fully endorse the idea that workers and
employers are not in a relationship of equal bargaining power and
that government intervention is required to ensure adequate
working conditions.
C. Termination of the Contract
German employers must confront severe restrictions on their
freedom of contract in the area of contract termination. Under the
Termination Protection Law,4 ' employers are required to provide
reasons for the termination of an employment contract which must
be clearly related to job performance or the needs of the com-
pany.14' In addition, if the works council expresses opposition to
a dismissal, a subject that the employer must broach with the works
council before taking action, the fired employee may continue to
work until the case is concluded by the court. 42 Moreover, it is
practically impossible for management to dismiss any member of
'7 Gesetz ueber den Schutz des Arbeitsplatzes bei Einberufung zum
Wehrdienst [Law Regarding the Protection of Jobs With Regard to the Draft],
1980 BGB1. I 425.
.38 Mindesturlaubsgesetz fuer Arbeitnehmer [Employee Minimum Vacation
Law] § 3, 1963 BGB1. I 2.
39 Gesetzueberdie Fortzahlung des Arbeitsentgelts im Krankheitsfalle [Law
Regarding the Continued Payment of Wages in Cases of Illness] § 1, 1969
BGBI. I 946.
140 KSchG, 1969 BGB1. 1 1317.
14' KSchG § 1.
142 KSchG § 1(2); BetrVG § 102.
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the works council.'43 Only in cases of serious behavioral dis-
ruption will a labor court sanction such an action.'44 Thus, the
employer's freedom of contract in an employment relationship
exists, if at all, only in a very restricted fashion.
CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental differences between civil and common
law systems is that in the former
[h]uman dignity and personal freedom derive from the
rights and duties laid down in law. Law therefore serves as
a guide to freedom and right living. In the common law
tradition, by contrast, freedom precedes law; freedom, after
all, is the individual's natural state; judges therefore make
law on a case-by-case basis as persons seek remedies for
intrusions upon their freedom.'45
Generally, this statement is correct in its evaluation of the differ-
ences between the German social state and the more libertarian
United States. But, as discussed above, the legal systems of the two
countries trade positions when it comes to discrimination. In
America, there are few controls on the labor relationship. An
employer can fire someone for good cause, bad cause or no cause
at all; except, however, when that cause is discrimination. In
Germany, all aspects of the labor contract are influenced by laws,
regulations and collective bargaining agreements except that an
employer's right to discriminate based on race or sex remains
largely immune from statutory limitations.
Manfred Gubelt, discussing Article Three's guarantee of equal
treatment articulated the position of the German legal establish-
ment:
Here the general tense relationship between freedom and
equality becomes especially clear. The farther one allows
Article Three to penetrate into the realm of private law, the
more private autonomy is restricted. Because the freedom
143 See WEISS, supra note 12, at 175.
144 KSchG § 15; BetrVG § 103.
14' Kommers, supra note 8, at 848.
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to form relations in the private sphere is in any case ever
more narrowed through a multiplicity of legislative rules,
it has been expressly promoted that here the constitutional
principle of freedom has priority.'46
German legal scholars thus admit that the decision to place freedom
of contract above equal treatment in the hierarchy of constitutional
values involves nothing more than arbitrary line-drawing. Much
like the Lochner Supreme Court, German courts do little more than
intone the principle of freedom of contract and fail to provide a
persuasive defense of its substance or its application. Perhaps this
hierarchical arrangement is simply a product of political inequity-
women are a weak interest group and minorities, most of whom are
not German citizens, are unable to vote. Unions and working
people, however, have vigorous and powerful political organiza-
tions. The legislative and judicial line-drawing in Germany,
therefore, may simply reflect this discrepancy in political strength.
One thing is clear, however, the principle of freedom of contract
cannot support the differential treatment.
146 Manfred Gubelt, Article 3, inGRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR 152, 153 (Ingo
von Muench ed., 2d. ed. 1981) (emphasis added).
